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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN THE
PRODUCTS OF CHILD LABOR,
Can Congress, under the power given to it by the Consti-
tution to regulate interstate commerce, prohibit interstate
commerce in the products of child labor?
In Hammer v. Dagenhart, decided in 1918, the Supreme
Court (by a five-to-four decision) held the Act of Sept. 1,
1916, C. 432, 39 Stat. 675, which prohibits transportation in
interstate commerce of goods made at a factory in which
thirty days prior to their removal therefrom children under
fourteen years have been employed, unconstitutional as ex-
ceeding the commerce power of Congress and invading the
powers reserved to the States.
A bill was filed in the U. S. District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina by a father in behalf of himself
and his two minor sons, employees in a cotton mill, to enjoin
the enforcement of the Act of Congress intended to prevent
interstate commerce in the products of child labor. The Dis-
trict Court held the Act unconstitutional and entered a decree
enjoining its enforcement. On appeal, the U. S. Supreme
Court affirmed the decision.
The attack upon the Act rested upon the proposition that
it was not a regulation of interstate and foreigu commerce.
In Gibbons v. Ogden,' Chief Justice Marshall defines
the commerce power of Congress, as "power to regulate; that
is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be gov-
erned." The power is one to control the means by which
commerce is carried on, not a power to forbid commerce
from moving and thus destroy it as to particular commodi-
ties. There is a line of cases (Champion v. Ames,2 the so-
called Lottery case; Hipolite Egg Co. v.3 U. S., which sus-
tained the power of Congress to prohibit interstate commerce
1. 9 Wheat. 1.
2. 188 U. S. 321.
3, 220 U. S. 45.
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in impure food; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland
lV Co.,4 sustaining the power of Congress to prohibit inter-
state commerce in intoxicating liquor; Hoke v. U. $5 and
Caminetti v. U. S.," sustaining the power of Congress to pro-
hibit interstate white slave traffic) which seem to establish
the doctrine that the power to regulate interstate commerce
incidentally includes the power to prohibit. But in these cases
tho nature of the subject regulated was such as to bring them
peculiarly within the governmental authority of the nation
and to render their exclusion but a regulation of interstate
commerce necessary to prevent the accomplishment through
that means of the evils inherent in them. Although the power
of Congress over interstate commerce was to regulate, regu-
lation could only be accomplished by prohibiting the use of
the facility of interstate transportation. The goods were
harmful per se. In the case of the products of child labor,
this element is entirely wanting. Such goods are in them-
selves harmless. The thing intended to be accomplished by
this statute is the denial of the facilities of interstate com-
merce to those manufacturers in the states which employ
children within the prohibited ages. The effect of the Act
is not to regulate interstate transportation, but to standardize
the ages at which children may be employed in mandfactur-
ing within the States. When offered for shipment and be-
fore transportation begins, the labor of the production of
the goods is over, and the mere fact that they were intended
for interstate transportation does not make their production
subject to Federal control under the commerce power.
In Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Ry. v. Yurkonis,
it is said: "The making of goods and the mining of coal are
not commerce, nor does the fact that the goods are after-
wards to be used in interstate commerce make their produc-
tion a part thereof."
Over interstat6 commerce or its incidents the regulating
4. 242 U. S. 311.
5. 227 U. S. 308.
6. 242 U. S. 470.
7. 238 U. S. 439.
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power of Congress is ample, but the production of articles
intended for interstate transportation is a matter of local
regulation. And as this statute aims not to regulate com-
merce, but to regulate production of any articles by child
labor, it is clearly in conflict with the Tenth Amendment to
the Constitution. The grant of power to Congress over the
subject of interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate
such commerce, and not to give it authority to control the
States in their exercise of the police power over local trade
and manufacture. The grant of authority over a purely Fed-
eral matter was not intended to destroy the local power always
existing and carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution.
Police regulations relating to the internal trade and affairs
of the States have been uniformly recognized as within the
powers reserved to the States. Keller v. U. S.,8 Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations,9 U. S. v. Dewitt.10
In Dartmouth College v. Woodward,"' Chief Justice Mar-
shall says: "The framers of the Constitution did not intend
to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institu-
tions, adopted for internal government, and the instrument
they have given us is not to be so construed."
"The maintenance of the authority of the States over mat-
ters purely local is as essential to the preservation of our
institutions as is the conservation of the supremacy of the
Federal power in all matters entrusted to the nation by the
Federal Constitution." Pipe Line Cases.12
The power of the States to regulate their purely internal
affairs by such laws as seem wise to the local authority is
inherent and has never been surrendered to the general gov-
ernment. New York v. Milu.' 3
8. 213 U. S. 138, 145, 146.
9. 7th Ed., p. 11.
10. 9 Wall. 41, 45.
11. 4 Wheat. 518.
12. 234 U. S. 548.
13. 11 Pet. 102, 139.
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In concluding his opinion, Justice Day says: "This Act
is in a twofold sense repugnant to the Constitution. It not
only transcends the authority delegated to Congress over
commerce, but also exerts a power as to a purely local matter
to which the Federal authority does not extend. The far-
reaching result of upholding the Act cannot be more plainly
indicated than by pointing out that if Congress can thus regu-
late matters entrusted to local authority by prohibition of
the movement of commodities in interstate commerce, all
freedom of commerce will be at an end, and the power of the
States over local matters may be eliminated, and thus our
system of government be practically destroyed."
LOUISE GRANT.
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